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Abstract: 
Central America continues to be a violent region and is prone to increasing climatic 
shocks and environmental degradation. This paper explores the non-linear feedback 
loop between violence and climate shocks on livelihood resilience in El Salvador and 
Honduras, two countries experiencing high rates of violence. The nature of this complex 
feedback loop is examined by analysing case studies on the community scale, which 
include challenges in reconstructing community social capital post-Hurricane Mitch 
(1998) in Honduras and the importance of social capital in community resilience to 
Hurricane Ida (2009) in El Salvador. We conclude that social capital is central in 
communities facing violence in order to enhance livelihood resilience to climate change 
impacts in Central America. 
 




A. Introduction  
Global climate change impacts pose 
serious threats to vulnerable livelihoods 
exposed to severe violent conflict, 
increased poverty, environmental 
degradation, political and economic 
crisis, and the exacerbation of risks to 
human security and societal stability of 
fragile states (Adger et al., 2014; Barnett 
and Adger, 2007; Hsiang et al., 2013; 
Scheffran et al., 2012a; Warner et al., 
2009). Scholars and political leaders are 
uncertain about how populations living in 
the most violent regions in the world will 
adapt to continuous extreme climatic 
shocks. Thus, it is crucial to understand 
the multi-causal triggers and diverse 
pathways of these compounded risks and 
identify key characteristics which 
enhance livelihood resilience and hinder 
cascading effects that lead to social, 
political and environmental collapse 
(Butzer, 2012). This paper investigates 
key characteristics of livelihood resilience 
by examining the ability for communities 
to maintain three key elements; buffer 
capacity, self-organization and capacity 
for learning (Ifejika Speranza et al., 
2014). In addition to these elements of 
resilience, social capital plays a central 
role in how communities respond to 
climate and violence. Social capital is 
defined as an asset related to access to 
networks, family/kin bonds, relationships 
with the state and civil society 
influencing trust and social cohesion 
(Bebbington, 1999; Putnam, 2001).  
In order to understand how climate 
change impacts and extreme violence 
could drive human insecurity, we must 
examine the mechanisms that influence 
low social capital and weak governance 
structures which can undermine human 
well-being (Adger et al., 2014). Violence 
and conflict can be exacerbated by a 
plethora of social factors that increase 
negative feedbacks such as high 
dependence on remittances, demographic 
pressures and an unequal distribution of 
wealth (Barnett and Adger, 2007). In 
addition, developing nations are likely to 
be the most affected by climate shocks, 
natural disasters and socio-political 
conflict (Mertz et al 2009).  The 
cascading effects may further limit fragile 
governance structures to alleviate 
problems, leading to increases in 
migration patterns and conflict in both 
migrant communities and residents in 
receiving areas (Reuveny, 2007). Some 
nation-states in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America are experiencing both trends: 
accelerating violent conflict and 
increasing vulnerability to climate shocks 
(Scheffran and Battaglini 2010, Sherbinin 
2013). These existing regional trends 
make climate change adaptation 
extremely challenging. 
 
An understanding of the potential 
feedback loops between violence and 
climate change and subsequent impacts 
on livelihood resilience in countries 
experiencing high rates of violence is 
essential to holistically address 
adaptation. Using case studies based in El 
Salvador and Honduras, two countries 
with some of the highest rates of violence 
in the world (UNDP 2009, Cruz, 2010), 
this paper explores how climate shocks 
impact trajectories of violence in post-
disaster communities and how extreme 
conflict conditions affect livelihood 
resilience before, during and after these 
shocks. The paper concludes that social 
capital is crucial to reduce conditions in 
which violence hinders livelihood 
resilience in post-disaster resettlements.  
 
B. State of Violence in Central 
America 
Central America has a historical ‘culture 
of violence’ which has developed into a 
violence-prone region (Buvinic, 2005; 
Imbush et al., 2011). It is considered to be 
the most violent region worldwide. In 
global rankings of countries by highest 
recorded homicide rate, Honduras 
infamously holds the number one spot 
and El Salvador is ranked number five 
(ECLAC, 2013; UNDOC, 2013). The rise 
in violence trends in the past few decades 
are linked to transnational organized 
crime, drug trafficking, guerrilla and 
paramilitary forces (Imbush et al., 2011; 
UNDOC, 2013). More recently, there has 
been an increase in gender-based 
violence, street crime and illegal or extra-
legal force used by government agents 
(UNDOC, 2013). All these issues are a 
continual source of fear for citizens, who 
are exposed to alarming rates of 
assassination, extortion, kidnapping and 
coercive impuesto de guerra, or war tax 
payments. These negative impacts affect 
livelihoods, leading to a deterioration of 
social capital and socio-economic 




Figure 1. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 population, from (1995-2012); data from 
Honduras is only available from1999-2012. Source: UNDOC 2012.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the high level of violence 
in Central America, using homicide as a 
proxy for violence.  Homicide is defined 
by UNDOC (2013), as “Unlawful death 
purposefully inflicted on a person by 
another person.” While intentional 
homicide is only one statistic that 
describes violence, it is clearly defined, 
the data is often available (in comparison 
to other types of violence, such as rape or 
domestic violence that go unreported) and 
comparable across countries. Homicide 
rates for El Salvador and Honduras are 
consistently above average in comparison 
to both Central America and the rest of 
the world. El Salvador experienced 
declining homicide rates in the late 90s, 
likely due to the demobilization and 
peace process initiated in 1992 after a 
twelve year civil war, while urban 
violence has dramatically increased in the 
past ten years. In contrast, Honduras did 
not experience the historic internal 
conflicts seen in El Salvador, with the 
exception of the 1966, Soccer War and 
the 2009 coup. However, Honduras has 
infamously risen as the most violent 
country in the world, outside of current 
war zones, due to the transnational drug 
trade, a weak state and high poverty 
(UNDOC, 2013). 
 
Though the effects of violence travel 
through all sectors of society, this paper 
focuses on the cycle of violence and the 
erosion of social capital in the context of 
climate change. Hypothesizing that the 
deterioration of social capital leads to 
greater rates of violence and vice versa, 
especially after a major natural disaster. 
Social capital, especially ‘binding’ social 
capital, or trust between community 
members, has been consistently found to 
mitigate the spread of violence across 
countries and cultures (Lederman et al, 
2002; Mcilwaine and Moser, 2001).  
 
Violence in the region has become 
institutionalized at different scales in 
governmental, private and civil sectors of 
society (Winton et al., 2011). Fragile and 
corrupt states have not been able to 
address the root problems of violence and 
overall citizens are dissatisfied and 
distrust institutional capacities and 
democratic governance (Perez et al, 
2013). This crisis of political and social 
violence has been theoretically 
characterized as a change from what Wolf 
(1969) described as “peasant wars of the 
twentieth century” to what Beall (2006) 
now calls “urban wars of the twenty-first 
century”, in part due to the rapid urban 
expansion and trajectories of 
transnational organized crime (Rodgers, 
2009). In response to this insecurity, 
some Latin American countries are taking 
a strong stance, establishing anti-gang 
laws and mano dura (iron fist) policies to 
combat violence. Mano dura is a 
government initiative of several Central 
American nations to crack down on gang 
activity through immediate arrest and 
incarceration of young men who have 
tattoos or flash gang signs (Hume, 2007). 
However, mano dura policies have not 
reduced violence rates and may contribute 
to increasing crime, by strengthening 
gang territoriality in confined prisons and 
enhancing bonds of transnational gangs 
(Gutierrez, 2010; Swanson, 2013).  
 
C. Climate Change in Central America 
Central America will face serious 
challenges from a changing climate, the 
IPCC report (2014) noted increments in 
temperature ranging from 0.7-1°C since 
the mid-1970s in Latin America. Climate 
change scenarios also project severe 
increases by 7 per cent and decreases by 
22 per cent in precipitation by 2100 
(Magri et al., 2014). Those drastic 
disturbances may lead to further 
limitations in fresh water, food 
availability and access to main food crops 
such as maize, beans, coffee and rice 
from regional agricultural production, 
impacting food security and sovereignty 
(ECLAC, 2010). In addition, large 
reductions of overall economic outputs of 
non-agricultural industries due to strained 
human labour from heat-related stress 
may also limit incomes across all sectors 
(Hsiang et al., 2013. 
Nations in the region are also vulnerable 
to climate variability and impacts from 
extreme events. These range from 
increased temperatures, intensification of 
storm events, floods, sea level rise, 
coastal erosion, prolonged periods of 
drought episodes and precipitation linked 
to El Niño and La Niña Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) events (Magri et al., 
2014). Climate shocks increase infectious 
vector-borne diseases and damage weak 
infrastructure (Moreno, 2006). These 
impacts may increase urban migration 
rates and displacement, exacerbating 
vulnerability of livelihoods as areas in the 
region are considered to be uninhabitable 
(forthcoming Wrathall et al., 2014). 
More specifically, El Salvador and 
Honduras have been exposed to multiple 
extreme events over the past 20 years. 
The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index, 
ranks countries that have suffered most 
from climatic events from 1992-2011 
based on five indicators: annual average 
death toll, death per 100,000 habitants, 
total losses in dollars - purchasing power 
parity (PPP), percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and total number of 
events. Honduras was ranked first as the 
country that has most suffered from 
extreme climate events while El Salvador 
was ranked fifteenth (Harmeling and 
Eckstein, 2013).   
 
 
Figure 2. Number of people affected  Figure 3. Disaster damage loss  
by natural disasters per year (1995-2010). 




Analysing statistics compiled from the 
emergency events database (EM-DAT) 
demonstrates the large number of people 
affected by disasters per year and the 
costs of disaster damage during 1995-
2010 (see Figures 2 and 3). In 1998, 
Hurricane Mitch, greatly impacted 
Honduras and stands out as most 
expensive disaster and the second in the 
total number of people affected. El 
Salvador experienced several large 
disasters in the last decade, namely 
Hurricane Stan (2005), Tropical Storm 






D. Violent conflict and the Climate 
Change Nexus 
Research regarding the impacts of climate 
change on human societies and socio-
ecological systems are revealing new 
insights on direct causal linkages and 
complex pathways. Yet, the climate and 
violence nexus has been criticized for 
lack of empirical evidence linking 
climatic events and conflict onsets 
(Bernauer et al., 2012; Buhaug, 2010; 
Gledistch, 2012; Klompt and Bulte, 2013; 
Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran et al., 2012a. 
However, several studies have 
empirically tested the relationship 
(Barnett and Adger, 2007; Hsiang et al., 
2013; Nel, 2008; Raleigh and Urdal, 
2007). Hsiang et al. (2013) shows a 
positive correlation between climatic 
changes and increases in human conflict 
with meta-analysis of over sixty studies. 
In addition, Anderson and DeLisi (2011), 
show that warming temperatures may 
influence irritability, aggression and 
violent intergroup conflict. Barnett and 
Adger (2007) and Raleigh and Urdal 
(2007) demonstrate that livelihoods may 
be affected by reductions in access and 
quality of natural resources such as water 
scarcity and decreased fertility in soils. In 
addition, Nel (2008) found that natural 
disasters significantly increase the risk of 
violent civil conflict in low income and 
economic growth countries with high 
levels of inequality and mixed political 
regimes. 
In light of these studies and our own 
research in Central America we propose a 
framework that reveals the influences 
between violent conflict and climate 
shocks on livelihood resilience (see 
Figure 4). The conceptual framework 
describes the multi-directional nature of 
feedback loops between violence and 
climatic shock impacts and the influences 
of social capital on livelihood resilience 
also hypothesized by Barnett and Adger 
(2007) and Scheffram et al. (2012b).  
 
We define livelihood resilience and social 
capital as the following: 
Livelihood resilience is related to three 
main elements: buffer capacity, self-
organization and capacity for learning. 
The buffer capacity of a livelihood is 
related to the endowments and 
entitlements within five assets (human, 
natural, financial, social and physical) 
which is influenced by the social sphere 
of self-organization in relation to 
institutions, cooperation, network 
structure, opportunities and reliance on 
own resources. Most importantly, the 
capacity for learning is a key factor in 
livelihood resilience. A resilient 
livelihood must understand threats and 
opportunities, share a collective vision, 
commitment to transfer and share 
capabilities to further increase 
functioning feedback mechanisms (Ifejika 
Speranza et al., 2014) 
 
Social capital is an asset related to access 
to networks, family/kin relationships with 
other actors, institutions, state and civil 
society organizational membership, social 
trust and civic engagement which can 
lead to social cohesion and social fabric 
(Bebbington, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 
2001; Putnam 2001). Social capital can be 
positive or negative (Fukuyama, 2001) 
 
High rates of violence and crime can lead 
to lower social capital, through the 
breakdown of trust which dislocates 
community ties and organization. This 
lowered social capital can disrupt 
community self-organization, a key 
element of livelihood resilience. Lower 
livelihood resilience will make it difficult 
for households, communities and even 
nations to rebound from external shocks, 
such as disasters.  For example, post-
disaster communities that recover slowly 
due to weak economic growth, social 
issues (isolation, mass migration, suicide 
and trauma) or political fragility may be 
vulnerable to increasing violence and 
crime, providing additional momentum to 
the cycle.  
 
Increased crime or violence can also 
lower livelihood resilience, if extortion by 
gangs reduces profits or prevents 
formation of small businesses that help 
households build up financial capital, or 
the necessary insurance to recover from 
climatic shocks. Households with low 
livelihood resilience that cannot 
financially recover from a shock may be 
more likely to migrate internally 
(Halliday, 2006), often to an urban area 
(Warner et al., 2009) which lowers social 
capital, as neighbours in the new 
settlement are strangers. Particularly in 
Central America, it is in these 
overcrowded or informal settlements in 
cities (slums) where rates of violence are 
high and still rising. 
 
However, the cycle can also be broken: 
While low social capital may reinforce 
feedback loops between violence and 
climate shock, high social capital can 
interrupt this loop and stop the vicious 
cycle. Disasters can provide a liminal 
space in which citizens can rethink their 
culture and community.  In the case of 
Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, the 
external shock of a disaster enabled 
resettled residents to choose to break the 
cycle of low social capital and violence it 
had known in previous communities.  By 
introducing strategies that built social 
capital while also preventing the 
infiltration of gang activity in their 
community, residents were able to reverse 
the cycle of violence, creating a 
community with greater capacity to deal 
with climate shocks in the future, 
demonstrating ‘buffer capacity’, a key 
characteristic of livelihood resilience. 
Communities with high social capital and 
characteristics such as a strong collective 
vision, community organization and a 
sense of union provide an important 
safety net that may be able to break the 
feedback loops in the violence and 
climate nexus. 
 
An understanding of the potential 
feedback loops between violence, 
livelihood resilience and climate change 
and the characteristics necessary to break 
them in Central American countries under 
historical high rates of violence is 
essential to holistically address 
adaptation. A micro-scale (community 
and household level) analysis of local 
dynamics helps to disentangle this 
violence-climate-livelihood nexus and 
draw out lessons that are applicable at the 
macro level (the state or region) for 
climate change adaptation.  
 
 
 Figure 4. Conceptual framework demonstrating potential feedback loops in the violent 
conflict and climate nexus which hinders livelihood resilience in Central America. Dotted 
circles represent endogenous community factors, while solid circles represent factors 
exogenous to the community 
Source: Author’s own 
 
 
E. El Salvador and Honduras 
Communities as Case Studies 
The community-scale case studies 
explore significant disaster events in the 
most violent countries in Central 
America- Hurricane Mitch in Honduras 
and Hurricane Ida in El Salvador. These 
cases (see Figure 5) contribute insights 
and concrete examples that illuminate the 
nexus described above. Each case 
analysis is a product of long-term (over 
five years) research, participatory 
observation, community surveys, and 
engagement in the communities studied. 
The case studies reveal different coping 
mechanisms to climatic events in the 
context of vulnerable populations living 
under violent conditions and 
environmental degradation. The case 
studies demonstrate how social capital is 
relevant to establish resilience at the 
community level.  
 
 Figure 5. Locations of case studies in El Salvador and Honduras. Source: Author’s own 
 
 
F. Social Resilience to Hurricane Ida 
and Community Violence 
Trajectories in El Salvador  
 
1. Disaster and Violence in El 
Salvador 
El Salvador is one of the most disaster 
vulnerable nations in the world according 
to the 2011 Germanwatch Climate Index 
(Harmeling and Eckstein 2013) and the 
2005 World Bank Disaster Hotspots 
(Dilley et al 2005). High disaster risk is a 
result of combining exposure to multiple 
threats such as earthquakes, droughts, 
floods, landslides and volcanoes together 
with high vulnerability from socio-
environmental factors such as population 
density, urbanization, deforestation and 
poverty. The small area and high 
population make El Salvador the most 
densely populated country in Central 
America with 292 persons/km2 (UNDAC 
2012). The population is concentrated in 
urban areas, a trend stemming from mass 
migration during the civil war (1980-
1992), which displaced 737,000 people 
internally and 1.5 million externally. The 
dominant internal migration trend was 
from rural to urban, as the poor fled the 
violent countryside (Mendoza, 1999).   
Urbanization has had lasting effects, 
changing the geography of poverty; 58 
per cent of El Salvador’s poor now live in 
cities (FLASCO-UNDP-MINEC, 2010). 
El Salvador has the second highest level 
of deforestation in Latin America, with 
only 2 per cent of original forest cover 
remaining (FAO, 2011). Although 
poverty has decreased by a third since the 
civil war, it is currently increasing: The 
number of households in poverty rose 
from 30 per cent to 40 per cent from 2006 
to 2011 (DIGESTYC, 2011). El Salvador 
remains one of the 10 poorest countries in 
Latin America and is in danger of 
slipping further into poverty if disasters 
increase (UNDAC, 2010). 
 
 
Table 1. El Salvador Disaster Statistics, 1992-2012 
Event Frequency # of people killed # of people 
affected 
Cost in 
Billions of $ 
Earthquake 4 1,160 1,607,771 $1.8 
Hydrological 24 1,008 577,843 $2.7 
Volcanic 1 2 2,000 Unknown** 
Drought 4 0 400,000 $0.22 
Epidemic 1 304 50,000 Unknown** 
Violence daily 82,650 Every citizen ~$9* 
*represents costs estimates from 1995, 2003, and 2008.  
**Likely low cost due to the infrequency and limited impact. 
Sources: Em-Dat 2012, Acevedo 2008, UNDP 2010, IUDOP 1999, and UNdata 2012. 
 
 
El Salvador is also one of the most 
violent countries in the world with 
homicide rates of around 65 per 100,000 
people (Geneva Declaration on Armed 
Violence and Development (2011). The on-
going violence consistently claims more 
lives and causes more economic damage 
than all other natural disasters combined 
(see Table 1). Increasing violence is often 
attributed to the rising gang influence in 
the country, with an estimated number of 
members ranging from 20,000-60,000 
(Hellenkamp, 2012; Perez, 2013). 
However, experts in the Salvadoran 
Forensic Institute and other civil society 
organizations report that only a small 
percent of homicides (10-20 per cent) can 
be attributed to gang violence, asserting 
that much of the violence in El Salvador 
is rooted in international organized 
criminal networks involved in trafficking 
arms, drugs and people, money 
laundering and other unlawful activities 
(Hellenkamp, 2012).  
Repressive state policies such as Mano 
Dura, established in 2003, increased 
violence rather than reducing it (Perez, 
2013). The failure of this policy is seen in 
Figure 1, showing an increase in 
homicide rates from 2003 to 2007. While 
a ‘gang truce’ brokered by the 
government in April 2012 temporarily cut 
homicide rates for one year (see homicide 
rate drop in figure 1, from 70 in 2011 to 
40 in 2012), homicide rates began to 
climb in May 2013 leading to a 
declaration by the president that the truce 
had failed. As of June 2014, the new 
Salvadoran government has no intention 
to continue the truce (Yagoub, 2014).  
The country’s social, economic and 
environmental vulnerabilities to disasters 
are expected to be intensified by climate 
change. Historically, 96.4 per cent of 
economic impacts of disasters in El 
Salvador are due to climatic events and 
just one climatic shock can devastate the 
economy (UNDAC, 2010). This case 
study investigates the social resilience of 
two Salvadoran communities to a climatic 
shock, in the form of Hurricane Ida in 
2009 (Tellman, 2011). The study includes 
fieldwork for the five years following the 
disaster to capture the development of 
each community.  Analysis of the 
divergent trajectory of violence in these 
two post-disaster communities provides a 
concrete example of potential feedback 
loops in the climate-violence-livelihood 
nexus. An in-depth analysis of these two 
communities provides important lessons 
for building climate change adaptation 
plans in the context of a violent and 
vulnerable El Salvador. 
2. Hurricane Ida 
On 7-8 November 2009, a low pressure 
system on the tail of Hurricane Ida 
resulted in an inundation of heavy rain: 
355 millimetres over the course of four 
hours, over El Salvador. Impacts 
included; 275 people dead or missing, 
over 75,000 persons displaced and 
economic losses in crops and 
infrastructure totalling $966 million 
dollars (Marroquin, 2010; Proteccion 
Civil, 2009). Ida was the fourth most 
economically disastrous event in El 
Salvador’s history, with an estimated 
90,000 Salvadorans directly affected 
(EM-DAT, 2012). 
The loss of human life, infrastructure and 
crops from Hurricane Ida was mainly due 
to the institutional vulnerability of the 
national government: Lack of activation 
of early warning systems, limited budgets 
for disaster mitigation and lack of 
emergency plans by Civil Protection - 
The Salvadoran Government’s disaster 
response division system for over half the 
country - are largely to blame for 
exacerbating the consequences of this 
event (Tellman, 2011). The lack of 
government response exposed the 
institutional inadequacy of the state in 
handling disasters, the consequences of 
which played out differently, depending 
on resilience at the community level. 
3. Social Resilience in Two 
Communities in Santiago 
Texacuangos 
A 2010 study of two communities, Joya 
Grande and Santa Maria in Santiago 
Texacuangos, El Salvador (Tellman, 
2011) explored non-material, sociological 
phenomena of resilience, recognizing that 
“social capital is a necessary glue for 
adaptive capacity, particularly in dealing 
with unforeseen events…social capital 
substitutes local management for state 
control” when the state fails, as it did in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Ida in El 
Salvador (Adger, 2003, p. 400). 
Santiago Texacuangos, a small peri-urban 
municipality of approximately 23,000 
people (COMURES, 2000) lies 30 
minutes south of the capital San Salvador 
on the south edge of the volcanic crater 
lake, Ilopango (see Figure 5). The dense 
population of 534 people/km2 live in 
concentrated settlements scattered 
throughout the mountainsides and 
ravines, with altitudes ranging from 478-
934m. Fragile volcanic soil on steep 
slopes, population growth during the civil 
war and deforestation made Santiago 
Texacuangos vulnerable to landslides 
triggered by heavy rainfall from Ida, 
which destroyed 65 houses and killed 18 
people (Proteccion Civil, 2009).  Corrupt 
and politicized aid distribution across 
governance scales (local-municipal-
national) hindered the reconstruction 
process. The Salvadoran state often relies 
on non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to perform aid distribution and 
reconstruction, however, Santiago 
Texacuangos lacked a strong local NGO 
network in 2009. As a result, many 
communities were left without state 
support in the aftermath (Tellman, 2011).  
Participant observation during Ida and its 
aftermath highlighted that the key to 
community resilience against this disaster 
was cognitive (not material) infrastructure 
(Tellman, 2011).  From the many 
communities in the Santiago 
Texacuangos district, two provide 
commonality for a comparative analysis; 
Santa Maria de la Esperanza and Joya 
Grande.  While these two communities 
are similar economically and 
geographically, their divergent 
development trajectories after Ida offer an 
excellent opportunity to investigate the 
mechanisms that led to different social 
outcomes.   
Santa Maria de la Esperanza (Santa 
Maria) was founded in 1982 by two North 
American nuns for refugees fleeing 
persecution in the northern countryside 
during the war who share a common 
identity in Catholicism and liberation 
theology and a strong belief that each 
person deserves and should fight for 
human rights. The main political party of 
members in the community is the Leftist, 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN).  The 
community upheld the belief that 
residents should participate and work 
together, leading to high community 
participation through meeting attendance, 
community workdays, community 
administered water system and a 
community store.  High participation also 
led to high organization and social 
cohesion. During the disaster, Santa 
Maria lost three lives, four houses, water 
and irrigation systems and suffered 
uncountable loss in crops and soil 
fertility. However, by the following 
morning, nearly the entire community 
was sheltered in the church, sharing 
resources. In the following days and 
weeks the community leveraged its 
‘networking’ social capital (Adger, 2003) 
to contact NGOs. It rebuilt the water 
system, began psycho-social intervention 
for victims, utilized a previously created 
environmental risk plan to explore 
necessity of community relocation and 
purchased radios for its emergency 
committee to prepare for the next big 
storm, illustrating the community’s high 
level of resilience through their quick 
recovery. 
In the comparative case of Joya Grande, 
the community was not founded during 
the civil war, however, it grew 
significantly during this period through 
rural to urban migration of refugees, who 
were fleeing violence in the hinterlands.  
Unlike Santa Maria, refugees were not 
necessarily connected to any particular 
religion or political movement. Joya 
Grande residents’ religious preference is 
fairly evenly divided between Catholics 
and Evangelicals, political preference is 
also fairly equally divided between 
parties on the left (FMLN) and right - 
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista de El 
Salvador (ARENA). Community 
participation in Joya Grande has been 
historically low; it has no community 
fund and does not manage its own water 
supply, meaning it must wait for the slow 
centralized national government support 
to fix water issues. There is no organized 
work system and in interviews, 
community members note that the 
community is not united and rarely works 
together to solve problems. The disaster 
was devastating to Joya Grande, with 50 
houses and five lives lost. Many families 
who suffered no damage to their home 
lost their livelihoods of subsistence 
fishing or farming.  
Recovery in Joya Grande was slow, 
partially due to the massive devastation, 
but also due to the lack of community 
organization.  Due to this lack of 
organization and community leadership 
there was no attempt to ask for NGO or 
government aid. As a result, humanitarian 
relief only trickled in from those 
international organizations which 
discovered that the community had been 
affected. Water systems and 
psychological attention came months 
after the disaster. Residents sheltered in 
marginal urban communities of Ilopango 
and Changallo for up to 3 months. 
Suggesting that Joya Grande lacks the 
social resilience that is evident in Santa 
Maria. 
Household surveys in each community 
(72 of 350 households in Joya Grande and 
41 of 70 households in Santa Maria), 
tested the hypothesis that community 
organization was the most significant 
factor in climate shock resilience. 
Quantitative analysis of the results 
examined major differences in how each 
community recovered from the disaster. 
Santa Maria’s superior organization is 
confirmed in an independent sample t-test 
comparing the perceived effectiveness of 
each Junta Directiva, or board of 
community leaders on general community 
organizing, emergency response, and 
reconstruction in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. Perceived effectiveness of Junta Directiva in Joya Grande and Santa Maria. P-
values for statistically significant differences: Community Organization (p=.001); 
Emergency Response (p=.001); Reconstruction (p=.529).  Source: Author’s own 
 
Santa Maria’s local governance is 
significantly more effective in general 
organization and emergency response 
than that of Joya Grande, though 
reconstruction efforts were perceived as 
insignificant. However, Junta Directivas 
are not the only form of social support.  
Households also listed eight different 
types of support: family, neighbours, 
churches, Junta Directivas, political 
parties, the community, municipal 
government, and NGOs. These types of 
support were then ranked on a scale of 1-
5: A ranking of one meant no support was 
gained whilst a five represented an 
excellent source of support.  Three 
sources of support significantly varied 
between the two communities: political 
parties, Junta Directiva, and community. 
All of which ranked higher in Santa 




Figure 7: Sources and levels of support in Joya Grand and Santa Maria. 
Independent Samples T-test. P-values for significance: Political Parties (p=.077); Junta 
Directiva (p=.002,); Community (p=.001); Family, p=.458. Source: Author’s own 
 
 
The political party support given to Santa 
Maria is also not surprising given its 
history with the FMLN.  The most 
notable and significant support factor is 
community organization and cohesion, 
evidenced by higher levels of support 
from the Junta Directiva and from the 
community in general, for Santa Maria. 
‘Binding’ social capital like local 
leadership and solidarity were key to 
recovery after Ida and will continue to be 
a determining factor in climate change 
adaptation for resilient communities such 
as, Santa Maria.   
 
4. Social Resilience, Disasters and 
Trajectories of Violence, Five Years 
Later 
Unfortunately, violence (homicides, 
extortion, robbery, battery) has steadily 
increased since Hurricane Ida in the 
region of Santiago Texacuangos and in 
communities like Joya Grande. In 
contrast, violence has not increased in 
Santa Maria. While official statistics do 
not disaggregate violence from the 
municipal to communal levels, cross 
validation from police interviews and 
news reports confirm that no homicides 
occurred in Joya Grande in the five year 
period before Ida (2004-2009), however, 
at least four homicides occurred in the 
five year post-Ida period (2009-2014).  In 
this small community of around 1,500 
people, this results in a homicide rate of 
over 50. The increase of violence in Joya 
Grande is not only experienced in 
homicides (Garcia 2012; La Prensa 
Grafica, 2013), but also extortion 
(ElSalvador.com, 2013), battery and 
robbery (Personal Interviews with 
Municipal Police, July 2014). In contrast 
to Joya Grande, Santa Maria de la 
Esperanza has had no reports of these 
crimes. 
When interviewed, a policeman who has 
been working in the region since 2008 
suggested that Hurricane Ida was the 
‘vector’, an event that paved the way for 
the epidemic of violence into Joya 
Grande, whilst low social capital had 
permitted the violence to permeate the 
community. The already low social 
capital in the community pre-Ida was 
undermined further by the landslides of 
2009, as local community leader Don 
Armando states “the soil erosion caused 
erosion of the social fabric.” Ida 
destroyed livelihoods, though the loss of 
crops, restaurants and small family 
businesses, such as fish farms and 
chicken coops.  Families without access 
to credit could not afford to rebuild 
livelihoods and made up for lost income 
by working in factories, or in one 
reported case, removing the eldest son 
from university.  The community became 
increasingly divided along political party 
lines, as both parties competed for votes 
in the 2011 municipal election, by 
providing aid to specific lists of families. 
While quantitative community surveys 
comparing social capital pre- and post-Ida 
are unavailable, qualitative analysis 
clearly points to the destabilization of 
community organization, participation, 
unity and trust. 
Due to the extended relocation of 
community members to marginal and 
dangerous urban areas, gangs obtained a 
foothold in the community. Families from 
Joya Grande spent up to three months in 
the shelter from November to January 
2009 and during this time the gang, MS-
13, recruited youth from the displaced 
community. Recruitment was made easier 
by the immense vulnerability of the youth 
including psychosocial trauma; lack of 
employment and education; lack of 
activities; and the presence of landslide 
scars and abandoned houses from families 
who never returned as discreet gathering 
places for illicit activities. 
However, the factor most emphasized by 
Joya Grande residents as the reason for 
the community’s inability to reduce 
violence is the same reason the 
community inadequately responded to the 
disaster; low social capital. Interestingly, 
police officers, in particular, emphasized 
the ‘binding’ social capital of community 
organization and trust as the most 
important foundation for violence 
prevention. In Santa Maria, the 
community was organized enough to 
know who comes in and out of the 
community and would not permit 
someone involved in gangs to continue to 
reside there. Furthermore, this community 
ran their own disaster shelter and unlike 
Joya Grande, did not have to temporarily 
migrate to other, more violent areas to 
seek shelter. Santa Maria has the 
‘networking’ social capital to organize 
outside resources and to stock their own 
shelter, even in absence of municipal or 
governmental aid. Joya Grande lacked the 
social capital to anchor participation, 
social cohesion and networking to protect 
their community from the threat of gang 
activity and violence. 
In the example of these two communities, 
social capital is the foundation for 
mitigating and responding to adverse 
phenomenon, whether disasters or gang 
violence. Local police emphasized that it 
was not only the poorest communities 
that are most vulnerable to disasters in 
Santiago Texacuangos and El Salvador, 
but poor communities which lack 
community organization and social 
capital that are most vulnerable to both 
disasters and violence. While disasters are 
not the only cause of increasing violence 
in communities with low social capital, as 
seen in the case of Joya Grande, the 
aftermath of a disaster can become a 
tipping point or a pathway to introduce 
violence into an already vulnerable 
community. In addition, local police 
officers predict that the current situation 
of violence has further reduced the 
community’s capability to respond to 
another climatic shock.  
While a greater number of long-term case 
studies tracking violence rates in post-
disaster communities would be required 
to make a conclusion, the juxtaposition of 
different violence and recovery 
trajectories for Joya Grande and Santa 
Maria highlights how violence, disasters 
and livelihood resilience are connected. In 
communities with low social capital, 
climate shocks can provoke the temporary 
migration that serves as a catalyst for 
gang violence and influence. In addition, 
the financial losses and food insecurity 
weakens social capital and reduces the 
capacity for a community to unite and 
respond to violence. The presence of 
extortion by gangs can increase financial 
risk and reduce incentives to open 
restaurants, stores, or transportation 
routes. Lack of livelihood options can 
provide another reason for youth to join 
gangs as an alternative, creating a 
continuous feedback cycle.  
G. Social Resilience to Hurricane 
Mitch and Community Violence 
Trajectories in Honduran 
Resettlements  
Honduras sits at the centre of both human 
vulnerability and natural disaster risk.  As 
a nation with a low human development 
index, Honduras is faced with; high 
poverty; a young and growing population; 
endemic corruption; and extreme 
violence.  Honduras has neither a strong 
state nor strong society on which to build 
resilience (Alaniz 2012a; UNDP, 2009).  
As well as human vulnerability, a 
confluence of factors has led to 
significant changes in land use in 
Honduras and increased environmental 
vulnerability (Leon and Lavell, 1996, p. 
58).  In 1960, 60 per cent of all land mass 
in Honduras was covered in pine, oak and 
various tropical hardwoods. By 2000, this 
figure had fallen to 49 per cent and by 
2007 it dropped another 10 per cent. Over 
the last 47 years, this equals a loss of 30 
per cent of forested areas (Lacey, 2007; 
World Bank, 2011). Honduras is also at 
high risk to major weather events. 
Statistically, at least once a decade, the 
nation will be hit- within 15 miles of the 
coast- by a major tropical storm or 
hurricane (Pielke et al., 2003). According 
to Freeman (2004, p. 10), “It is likely that 
natural disasters will be the most 
significant external shock to Honduras in 
the next 15-20 years.” 
5. Hurricane Mitch 
As the fourth most powerful hurricane 
ever recorded in the Caribbean (NOAA, 
2009), Hurricane Mitch (1998) devastated 
the small nation of Honduras, affecting 
nearly half of the  population and 
displacing hundreds of thousands.  United 
Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Deputy Resident Representative 
in Nicaragua, Nicola Harrington noted, "I 
don't know if we are talking about a 
[development] setback to the 1960s or the 
70s…the only thing which is certain is 
that recovery and reconstruction will take 
a long, long time" (UNDP, 1998).  After 
the hurricane, aid flooded into the country 
and the Honduran president promised that 
the nation would “build back better”.  
Indeed, most Hondurans hoped that with 
the aid of foreign nations and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) they 
could utilize this disaster as an 
opportunity to address issues of poverty 
and crime in the country. 
Unfortunately, this has not been most 
Hondurans’ experience (Ensor, 2010).  
Although the nation’s infrastructure was 
rebuilt, larger social issues remain: crime 
is ubiquitous, and corruption entangles 
many institutions, lowering citizen trust 
in government (Alaniz, 2012a, Ch. 4). 
Gang violence has earned the nation the 
infamous title ‘homicide capital of the 
world’. Yet, this context contrasts sharply 
with the experience of some resettlements 
founded after Hurricane Mitch, which 
despite the difficult environment, have 
created communities with higher levels of 
social capital than many neighbourhoods 
that were not impacted by Hurricane 
Mitch. The following two case studies 
illustrate a feedback loop between 
violence and social health and indicate 
that social capital is a significant issue, 
which can be challenged and changed. 
H. Ciudad Divina Providencia and 
Ciudad España  
The two communities of Ciudad Divina 
Providencia (Divina) and Ciudad España 
(España), - given their similarities 
immediately after the hurricane in 
contrast to their dramatically different 
situations today - offer a strategic 
opportunity for a comparative analysis of 
community development.  In response to 
Hurricane Mitch, NGOs built Divina and 
España to accommodate citizens from 
across Tegucigalpa who had lost their 
homes.  Members of each community 
maintained comparable working and 
lower-middle class socio-economic 
statuses, racial homogeneity and each 
community had similar resettlement 
infrastructure.  Both Divina and España 
were resettled in the Amarateca Valley, 
eighteen miles northeast of the capital 
(see Figure 5).   
Re-settlement in the communities has 
been remarkably different: Divina thrives 
economically, sustains a low crime rate, it 
maintains high civic participation and a 
general sense of well-being and safety for 
vulnerable populations such as women 
and children.  In contrast, gang problems, 
crime and other social ills such as drug 
and alcohol abuse trouble España. This 
‘natural experiment’ of two similar 
communities beginning anew but 
experiencing drastically different 
outcomes offers a unique occasion for 
advancing understanding of post-disaster 
resilience opportunities and mechanisms 































Divina 95.4* 42* 0* .7** .7 12.1** 
España 270.7 116 30.42 † .514 1.37 8.9 
 
Z-test significance at *.01, **.05 
† The homicide rate in España (.49) averaged annually is still less than half of that in 
Tegucigalpa (100.13) (Honduras Weekly, 2011). 
Source: Source: Divina (2002-2010) and España (2004-2010) community police station 
records 
 
Table 2 illustrates significant differences 
in crime between the two communities. 
España citizens are significantly more 
afraid to go out at night, mainly due to the 
high crime in their community. 
Additionally, when residents in both 
communities were asked to compare the 
delinquency rate of their pre-Mitch 
community with their current one, 96 per 
cent of Divina residents believe it is less 
while only 34 per cent of España citizens 
do. Based on the crime indicator alone, 
the difference in social health between the 
two communities is alarming. Although 
there are many factors that affect crime 
rates, residents and leaders repeatedly 
point to differing NGO practices as the 
most significant factor affecting crime 
rates.   
I. Preventing Violence in 
Resettlements 
One would expect that when two groups 
are drawn from the same population and 
provided with comparable economic and 
infrastructure resources, the groups would 
have similar outcomes. Yet, as seen in 
Table 2, this was not the case for España 
and Divina.   
Alaniz, (forthcoming 2015), describes the 
‘liminal space’ of post-disaster 
resettlements in which there is no pre-
existing infrastructure or social structure, 
which can provide residents and the 
supporting NGO an opportunity to create 
resilience.  In the case of Divina, the 
NGO worked with the community to 
create a strong vision and maintain it in 
the face of external and internal threats, 
including gangs, drug dealers and 
problematic families.  Together they built 
a sense of trust, social cohesion and 
collective efficacy, creating a community 
with higher social capital. 
However, España, had a different process 
and outcome: As with Divina an NGO 
helped create a community vision, but 
was less engaged in the maintenance of 
that vision. As a result, residents returned 
to the social structures they had known in 
Tegucigalpa.  These social structures 
promoted greater individuality, protection 
of self and property and did not 
encourage the type of resilience seen in 
Divina. Without this social resilience, 
gangs were able to enter the community, 
notably increasing the violence. 
Homicides became commonplace, 
reinforcing the lack of cohesion and trust 
among residents and the belief that 
violence was a part of the community, 
thereby leading to lower social resilience. 
Resettlements, offer evidence and hope 
that a cycle of vulnerability and violence 
is not pre-determined. The mantra of 
‘build back better’, when it includes 
infrastructure and social capital can lead 
to improved livelihoods among disaster 
survivors. It is difficult and requires 
significant time and resources, but it is 
possible.   
J. Discussion 
The cases presented illustrate both 
potential increase of violence in a post-
disaster situation (El Salvador and 
Honduras) and increased vulnerability to 
disaster in places of violent conflict as 
theorized (see Figure 4). However, the 
same cases include examples of resilient 
communities that have escaped the 
climate-violence nexus. In the presence of 
strong social capital, community bonds 
and a collective vision, disasters might 
not lead to more violence after a climatic 
shock. In the context of climate 
adaptation, it is critical to understand the 
conditions under which violence and 
disaster vulnerability reinforce each other 




6. When does Violence Increase Post-
Disaster? 
Violence can increase after climate shock 
when attention to social conditions is 
neglected, both in the immediate 
aftermath and in long-term resettlement 
(Ned et al., 2008). In El Salvador, the 
example of Joya Grande shows that 
extensive time in disaster shelters in 
marginal urban areas with a high rate of 
gang presence can facilitate urban gang 
recruitment of rural youth. In other 
communities, like Santa Maria, which has 
its own disaster shelter, youth who may 
be predisposed to join gangs are not 
exposed to the possibility in an urban 
shelter in another community. A focus on 
more localized disaster shelters that do 
not require urban migration to a ‘safe 
space’, or programs for youth in shelters 
for an extended period of time, could 
combat this potential pathway of 
increased violence in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster.  
Communities can also be vulnerable to 
increasing violence in the reconstruction 
and resettlement process post-disaster. 
The post-Mitch situation in Honduras 
contains many examples of communities 
like España, where resettlement focused 
on building physical infrastructure, 
neglecting the social infrastructure. The 
lack of focus on the community’s social 
capital allowed violence and social 
disorder to obtain a foothold. Likewise, in 
the community of Joya Grande, El 
Salvador, a slow reconstruction and 
continuing erosion of social capital in the 
months and years following the disaster 
further exposed the community to 
violence that may have begun in urban 
shelters in the days following Hurricane 
Ida. In both cases, the community lacked 
a focus on violence prevention and 
community or institutional organizations 
either did not or could not adequately 
respond to the situation. 
However, disasters do not 
deterministically lead to more violence. 
Communities that have high social 
capital, or resettled communities where 
strong institutions have focused on 
building social capital, do not experience 
increased violence post-disaster. In 
Honduras, Divina has not experienced a 
single homicide since resettlement in 
2002. This community has half the crime 
rate of neighbouring España. The NGO 
that founded Divina focused on building 
social capital and this commitment to 
construct the social fabric of the 
community effectively prevented violence 
and gang activity from becoming a larger 
problem, illustrating that post-disaster 
resettlement can provide better living 
conditions than residents held previously.  
In the case of El Salvador, the high social 
capital of Santa Maria either directly 
limited the spread of violence post 
disaster, or was resilient enough to 
disaster that Hurricane Ida did not 
provide pathways to increase violence. 
For example, because Santa Maria had its 
own community shelter, vulnerable youth 
were not exposed to gang recruitment 
through temporary urban migration.  In 
addition, the strong community 
organization led to rapid recovery post-
disaster and the event did not erode the 
social fabric of Santa Maria, as it did in 
less resilient Joya Grande. Even if Santa 
Maria had gone to municipal shelters and 
youth had been successfully recruited by 
gangs, interviews with police express 
that, given the strong community 
organization it is unlikely that the 
community would have permitted gang 
members to continue to live there.  
7. Lessons for Climate Adaptation and 
Livelihood Resilience 
These cases not only illuminate the link 
between past climate shocks and 
violence, but also provide lessons when 
considering livelihood resilience and 
climate adaption for fragile states facing 
high violence. The importance of a 
holistic framework that considers disaster 
risk mitigation, climate adaptation and 
violence prevention together is essential. 
Further research and case studies are 
required to fully grasp how violent 
communities respond to disaster and 
violence trajectories after disaster events 
in fragile and violent states. A regional 
assessment of violence-climate hotspots 
could identify communities that require 
intervention and support to increase 
livelihood resilience. A more extensive 
compilation of best practices of 
communities like Divina and Santa Maria 
that have broken the violence-climate 
feedback loop may identify actions that 
could be replicated in ‘hotspot’ 
communities. 
The results of this study also require a re-
examination of current policies and 
practices. Disaster risk mitigation and 
resettlement programs or policies that 
neglect the potential for erosion of social 
capital and increased violence, should be 
revisited. Failed violence prevention 
policies of mano dura in Honduras and El 
Salvador do not address the erosion of 
social capital as a pathway to violence. 
Violence prevention policies must include 
provisions to strengthen community 
organizations. 
8. Conclusion 
It is not just the poorest countries that 
may be most vulnerable to climate 
change, but also the countries with 
highest rates of violence and conflict. 
Analysis of past climatic shocks in 
countries such as Honduras and El 
Salvador provide evidence of non-linear 
feedback loops between cycles of 
violence and climate vulnerability.  
Lessons from these cases serve as a future 
warning to the potential of increasing 
climate shocks to increase violence in 
Latin America and in other countries in 
conflict. With the rise of violence in 
many parts of the world, implementing 
lessons about the importance of social 
capital to increase livelihood resilience to 
both climate shock and violence is critical 
for human well-being. 
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